Mishneh Torah — Sabbath (Shabbat) הלכות שבת, Chapter 12

הַמַּבְעִיר כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב. וְהוּא שֶׁיְּהֵא צָרִיךְ לָאֵפֶר. אֲבָל אִם הִבְעִיר דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה פָּטוּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מְקַלְקֵל. וְהַמַּבְעִיר גְּדִישׁוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ הַשּׂוֹרֵף דִּירָתוֹ חַיָּב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מַשְׁחִית. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכַּוָּנָתוֹ לְהִנָּקֵם מִשּׂוֹנְאוֹ וַהֲרֵי נִתְקָרְרָה דַּעְתּוֹ וְשָׁכְכָה חֲמָתוֹ וְנַעֲשָׂה כְּקוֹרֵעַ עַל מֵתוֹ אוֹ בַּחֲמָתוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב וּבְחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ בִּשְׁעַת מְרִיבָה שֶׁכָּל אֵלּוּ מְתַקְּנִים הֵן אֵצֶל יִצְרָן הָרַע. וְכֵן הַמַּדְלִיק אֶת הַנֵּר אוֹ אֶת הָעֵצִים בֵּין לְהִתְחַמֵּם בֵּין לְהָאִיר הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. הַמְחַמֵּם אֶת הַבַּרְזֶל כְּדֵי לְצָרְפוֹ בְּמַיִם הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מַבְעִיר וְחַיָּב:

A person who kindles even the smallest fire is liable, provided he needs the ash that it creates. However, should a person kindle a fire with a destructive intent, he is not liable, for he is causing ruin.Nevertheless, a person who sets fire to a heap of produce or a dwelling belonging to a colleague is liable, because his intent is to take revenge on his enemies. [Through this act,] he calms his feelings and vents his rage. He is comparable to a person who rends his garments over a deceased person or in rage [on the Sabbath], or a person who injures a colleague in an argument. These individuals are all considered to be performing a constructive activity, because of their evil inclinations.Similarly, a person who lights a candle or wood, whether to generate warmth or light, is liable. 495, which explains that in this halachah, the Rambam outlines two types of fires for which one is liable. He begins the halachah with the statement that a person is liable for kindling a fire, "provided he needs the ash that it creates." This refers to a fire kindled for no purpose other than the production of ash.Afterwards, the Rambam begins to describe when a person is liable for kindling fires that are used for constructive activity. e.g., to generate warmth or to cook. In these instances, there is no requirement that one require the ash.A person who heats iron in order to strengthen it by submerging it in water is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of kindling. in this regard:a) That of the Rambam, mentioned in this and the following halachah, which holds one liable for heating and extinguishing iron in order to strengthen it;b) That of the Ra'avad, which exempts a person for both kindling and extinguishing metal. He maintains, however, that a person who performs these actvities is liable, the liability stemming from other categories of forbidden labors;c) That of Rashi (Shabbat 42a, 134a), which holds a person liable for kindling metal, but exempts him for extinguishing. (See also the Sefer Yereim, which explains that, in the construction of the Sanctuary, the heating of metal and its refinement was necessary for the goldsmiths and silversmiths.)Rav Kapach explains the Rambam's position, emphasizing that there is a difference between iron and other metals. All other metals are made more pliable when heated. In contrast, as iron is made into steel, it becomes harder when heated and then placed into water. Therefore, just as the labors of kindling and extinguishing are associated with making charcoal - a new entity - so, too, it is these categories of labor that relate to the process of making steel. (See also the responsum of Rav Avraham, the Rambam's son, mentioned in the notes on the following halachah.)

הַמְכַבֶּה כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב. אֶחָד הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַנֵּר וְאֶחָד הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַגַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל עֵץ. אֲבָל הַמְכַבֶּה גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת פָּטוּר. וְאִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְצָרֵף חַיָּב. שֶׁכֵּן לוֹטְשֵׁי הַבַּרְזֶל עוֹשִׂים מְחִמִּים אֶת הַבַּרְזֶל עַד שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה גַּחֶלֶת וּמְכַבִּין אוֹתוֹ בְּמַיִם כְּדֵי לְחַסְּמוֹ. וְזֶהוּ לְצָרֵף שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ חַיָּב וְהוּא תּוֹלֶדֶת מְכַבֶּה. וּמֻתָּר לְכַבּוֹת גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהּ רַבִּים. הַנּוֹתֵן שֶׁמֶן לְתוֹךְ הַנֵּר הַדּוֹלֵק חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מַבְעִיר. וְהַמִּסְתַּפֵּק מִן הַשֶּׁמֶן שֶׁבַּנֵּר חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מְכַבֶּה:

A person who extinguishes [a fire]).See also the Sefer Yereim which mentions that extinguishing was necessary for the work of the goldsmiths and silversmiths. of even the smallest size is liable. [This includes both] one who extinguishes a candle and one who extinguishes a coal that comes from wood. (Orach Chayim 27:1, 334:27, differ and do not hold a person liable in such an instance. According to these authorities, a person is liable for extinguishing only when he requires the coals produced. In contrast, a person who extinguishes a glowing piece of metal is not liable., Vol. III, Responsum 60 and Tzafenat Paneach, Responsum 273.)If, however, the person's intent is to purify the metal, he is liable. This indeed is the practice of blacksmiths; they heat the iron until it glows like a coal, and extinguish it in water to seal it. This is the process of purification for which one is liable. It is a derivative [of the category of forbidden labor] of extinguishing.It is permissible to extinguish a glowing piece of metal 334:27). in the public domain so that many people will not be injured by it.A person who pours oil into a burning lamp is liable for kindling. [Similarly,] a person who takes oil from a lamp is liable for extinguishing. states that seemingly the opinions that do not accept Rabbi Yehudah's view regarding a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה would not hold the person liable unless his intent in extinguishing the candle was for the charcoal produced. See the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 365:1).

דְּלֵקָה שֶׁנָּפְלָה בְּשַׁבָּת הַמְכַבֶּה אוֹתָהּ מִפְּנֵי אִבּוּד מָמוֹן חַיָּב שֶׁאֵין אִבּוּד מָמוֹן דּוֹחֶה שַׁבָּת אֶלָּא אִבּוּד נְפָשׁוֹת. לְפִיכָךְ יֵצְאוּ בְּנֵי אָדָם כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יָמוּתוּ וְיַנִּיחוּ הָאֵשׁ תְּלַהֵט וַאֲפִלּוּ שׂוֹרֶפֶת כָּל דִּירָתוֹ כֻּלָּהּ:

Should a fire break out on the Sabbath, a person is liable if he extinguishes it because of fear of monetary loss. It is only the threat of loss of life, and not monetary loss, that supersedes the Sabbath prohibitions.Therefore, all people should leave [the area of the blaze] so they do not die. They should let the fire continue to burn, even if it consumes the entire city. 334:26) follows the view that one is not liable for performing a מלאכה שאינה צ ריכה לגופה, and the prohibition against extinguishing a fire is merely Rabbinic in nature. Accordingly, he states that in the present time, it is permissible to extinguish a fire that has begun to blaze in a city.In his time, it was common for the commotion caused by a fire to serve as an invitation for the gentiles to raid the Jewish quarters of the city, rampaging, pillaging, and creating havoc. In such a situation, it was very possible that Jewish lives would be threatened. Hence, he maintains that it is preferable for the fire to be extinguished than for such a situation to be created. Furthermore, in the cramped conditions of the ghettos, it was highly possible that the lives of the children, the elderly, and the disabled would be threatened by a fire.Nevertheless, even the Ramah did not grant wholesale leniency on this matter and stated that, in practice, the ruling must be determined on the basis of our appreciation of whether there is a threat to life according to the circumstances at hand. Contemporary authorities add that because of the threat of electrical fires, gas explosions, and the like, a fire constitutes a real danger and should not be allowed to spread.

מֻתָּר לַעֲשׂוֹת מְחִצָּה בְּכָל הַכֵּלִים בֵּין מְלֵאִים בֵּין רֵיקָנִים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תַּעֲבֹר הַדְּלֵקָה. אֲפִלּוּ כְּלִי חֶרֶשׂ חֲדָשִׁים מְלֵאִים מַיִם עוֹשִׂין מֵהֶן מְחִצָּה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁוַּדַּאי מִתְבַּקְּעִין וּמְכַבִּים. שֶׁגְּרַם כִּבּוּי מֻתָּר. וְכוֹפִין קְעָרָה עַל גַּבֵּי הַנֵּר בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא תֵּאָחֵז בַּקּוֹרָה:

It is permissible to construct a barrier using any type of container - whether full or empty - so that a fire will not spread. One may even construct a barrier using new earthen vessels filled with water, although they will surely break and extinguish [the fire]. 334:22). It is permissible to cause [a fire to be] extinguished [indirectly]. 2:2) states "It is forbidden to cause [indirectly] a fire to be extinguished." Rav Kapach notes, however, that in authoritative manuscripts of that text, this line is erased. See also Chapter 5, Halachah 13.This equivocation in the Rambam's mind is also reflected in a difference of opinion between the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:22) quotes the Rambam's ruling that it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly. The Ramah, however, states that this is permitted lest a loss occur. This implies that there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, but that the prohibition is waived because of the possibility of property loss.One may place a bowl 277:8; Mishnah Berurah 277:23). over a candle so that [the light] will not catch on the beams [of the roof].

תֵּבָה שִׁדָּה וּמִגְדָּל שֶׁאָחַז בָּהֶן הָאוּר מֵבִיא עוֹר גְּדִי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ מִדְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין הָאוּר מְלַהֶטֶת אוֹתָן וּפוֹרְשׂוֹ עַל הַקָּצֶה שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא נִשְׂרַף כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תַּעֲבֹר שָׁם הָאֵשׁ:

When a fire catches on to a perfume box, 16:5). a chest, or a [wooden] cabinet, one may bring a goat's skin), the Rambam explains that a goat skin will become singed by a fire, but will not burst into flames. or another substance that will not catch fire and spread it over the portion that has not been consumed, so that the fire will not reach there.

טַלִּית שֶׁאָחַז בָּהּ הָאוּר פּוֹשְׁטָהּ וּמִתְכַּסֶּה בָּהּ וְאִם כָּבְתָה כָּבְתָה. וְכֵן סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה שֶׁאָחַז בּוֹ הָאוּר פּוֹשְׁטוֹ וְקוֹרֵא בּוֹ וְאִם כָּבָה כָּבָה. וְנוֹתֵן מַיִם מִן הַצַּד שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא נִתְלָה בּוֹ הָאוּר וְאִם כָּבְתָה כָּבְתָה. שָׁכַח נֵר דָּלוּק עַל גַּבֵּי טַבְלָא מְנַעֵר אֶת הַטַּבְלָא וְהוּא נוֹפֵל וְאִם כָּבָה כָּבָה. אֲבָל הִנִּיחוֹ מִבָּעֶרֶב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכָּבָה אָסוּר לְטַלְטְלוֹ:

When a garment [that is folded] catches on fire, one may spread it out and don it; if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant. (Orach Chayim 334) states that one may not have the intention of extinguishing the fire, but merely of preventing it from spreading further. Note the difference of opinion between the Magen Avraham and the Turei Zahav if that ruling is accepted. Similarly, if a Torah scroll has caught fire, one may unroll it and read from it, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant. One may place water 120a, accept the basis of the ruling cited by the Rambam, but maintain that one must use liquids other than water. Pouring water over a garment resembles the forbidden activity of laundering and is not permitted on the Sabbath, even in this situation. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 334:24) favors Tosafot's opinion. on the portion that has not yet caught fire, if [in the process, the fire] is extinguished, it is not significant. (loc. cit.), Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Ra'avad differ and forbid this leniency. They maintain that although it is permitted to cause a fire to be extinguished indirectly, placing water in such proximity to the fire is no longer considered an indirect activity. As obvious from the previous note, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) does not accept this opinion.If a person left a burning candle on a board, 277:12). one may shake the board, causing the candle to fall. If it is extinguished, it is not significant. 277:14). For this reason, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 277:3) states that this applies only with regard to a wax candle or an oil lamp if the oil has already burned out. In this instance, it is possible that the candle will continue burning even if it falls. In contrast, an oil lamp that contains oil may not be moved in this manner.The Maggid Mishneh, however, explains that the Rambam's ruling can be accepted even with regard to an oil lamp which contains oil. The Aruch states that a person is not held liable when he performs an act that will inevitably bring about the commission of a forbidden labor, if he is displeased with the fact that the labor was committed (פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה). To apply that concept to the present situation, although spilling the oil from the lamp is considered as extinguishing the lamp, since th person did not intentionally desire to spill it and he regrets the loss of the oil, he should not be held liable. The commentaries also point to several other rulings that indicate that the Rambam accepts this principle. If he [intentionally] placed it down [before] nightfall, it is forbidden to move [the board], which states לטלטלו, concluding with a masculine suffix that seemingly refers to the candle, rather than the board. Nevertheless, as the commentaries point out, it is self-evident that the candle is forbidden to be moved. The new concept brought out by this law is that since the candle was intentionally left on the board before the commencement of the Sabbath, as explained in Chapter 25, Halachah 17, the board is considered a base for a forbidden object and is also muktzeh, forbidden to be moved (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.). even after the candle is extinguished.

נָכְרִי שֶׁבָּא לְכַבּוֹת אֵין אוֹמְרִים לוֹ כַּבֵּה וְאַל תְּכַבֶּה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין שְׁבִיתָתוֹ עָלֵינוּ. אֲבָל קָטָן שֶׁבָּא לְכַבּוֹת אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. וְהוּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה עוֹשֶׂה עַל דַּעַת אָבִיו. אֲבָל מִדַּעַת עַצְמוֹ אֵין בֵּית דִּין מְצֻוִּין לְהַפְרִישׁוֹ. וּבִדְלֵקָה הִתִּירוּ לוֹמַר כָּל הַמְכַבֶּה אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד:

If a fire broke out on the Sabbath and a gentile comes to extinguish it, we may not tell him, "Extinguish it," nor [must we tell him,] "Do not extinguish it," for his resting is not our responsibility.In contrast, should a child desire to extinguish [the fire], he should not be allowed if he is acting on his father's behalf.). If he is acting on his own initiative, the court is not obligated to restrain him. 17:27. Among the resolutions of this difficulty is that in the halachah cited, the Rambam is speaking about an activity that will benefit the child's father. See the notes on that halachah.In the instance of a fire, [our Sages 121a, Ketubot 70b.] permitted a person to say, "Anyone who extinguishes the fire will not suffer a loss."

הוֹצָאָה וְהַכְנָסָה מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת מְלָאכָה מֵאֲבוֹת מְלָאכוֹת הִיא. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדָּבָר זֶה עִם כָּל גּוּפֵי תּוֹרָה מִפִּי משֶׁה מִסִּינַי נֶאֶמְרוּ. הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר בַּתּוֹרָה (שמות לו ו) "אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה אַל יַעֲשׂוּ עוֹד מְלָאכָה לִתְרוּמַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ וַיִּכָּלֵא הָעָם מֵהָבִיא". הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁהַהֲבָאָה מְלָאכָה קוֹרֵא אוֹתָהּ. וְכֵן לָמְדוּ מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה שֶׁהַמַּעֲבִיר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע הֲרֵי הוּא כְּמוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת וְחַיָּב:

Transferring The translation of the standard printed version of the text would be "Bringing articles or removing articles from...." Whether one is bringing an article in or removing it, one is transferring it. See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 1:1).The wording of the manuscripts avoids the difficulties mentioned by the Lechem Mishneh and others that arise from Shabbat 96b. objects from one domain to another is one of the categories of labor [forbidden on the Sabbath].Although this [prohibition], as all other elements of the body of Torah law, was communicated orally by Moses [as he received them] from Sinai, it is also [alluded to within] the Torah itself. [Exodus 36:6] relates: "[Moses ordered that an announcement be made:] 'No man or woman should do any further work concerning the donations to the Sanctuary.' And the people stopped bringing [their gifts]." From this, one can infer that bringing [an article from one domain to another] is [also] referred to as "labor." 2a, explain that this verse is necessary because, in contrast to the other activities classified as forbidden labors, transferring articles is "an inferior labor" - i.e., we would not ordinarily conceive of it as being forbidden. (See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 1:1, which states that transferring articles does not appear to be an activity fit to be considered a forbidden labor.)Eruvin 17b derives the prohibition against the transfer of articles from one domain to another from the exegesis of Exodus 16:29. Tosafot (Eruvin, loc. cit.; Shabbat, loc. cit.) explain that both verses are necessary: one to teach that bringing an article in from the public domain to a private domain is forbidden, and the other to teach the converse, that it is forbidden to take an article out from the private domain to the public domain.The Rambam (particularly according to the version of the Mishneh Torah we have quoted) appears to view the concept of transferring as one activity which is prohibited on the basis of the oral tradition. Nevertheless, unlike the other categories of forbidden labor, in this instance there are allusions within the Torah itself. To make this point, he quotes the most obvious allusion, leaving the one in Eruvin for the scholars.Similarly, we have learned according to the oral tradition 96b. that a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] is comparable to a person who transfers an article from one domain to another and is liable.

אֵין הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא כַּשִּׁעוּר הַמּוֹעִיל. מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אוֹ מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד. וְיַעֲקֹר מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ וְיַנִּיחַ בִּרְשׁוּת שְׁנִיָּה. אֲבָל אִם עָקַר וְלֹא הִנִּיחַ אוֹ הִנִּיחַ וְלֹא עָקַר אוֹ שֶׁהוֹצִיא פָּחוֹת מִכַּשִּׁעוּר פָּטוּר. וְכֵן הַמַּעֲבִיר מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲקֹר כַּשִּׁעוּר מִצַּד זֶה וְיַנִּיחֶנּוּ מִצַּד אַחֶרֶת:

A person who transfers an object from one domain to another is not liable until he transfers an object of sufficient size to be useful from a private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to a private domain., a domain which is forbidden by Rabbinic decree. The definitions of the various domains with regard to the Sabbath laws are found in Chapter 14.Similarly, one must remove the article from one domain and place it down in the second domain. A person is not liable if he merely:removed the article and did not place it down [and another person took it from his hand and placed it down],placed. If a homeowner picked something up to give to a poor man standing outside, and the poor man took it from his hand - since the homeowner did not place the article down (הנחה), he is not liable. it down [after taking it from the hand of the person who removed it], but did not remove it [himself], ortransferred elaborates, there are several different possibilities for two people to combine in transferring an object, one performing the עקירה, and the other the הנחה. less than an amount [that is useful].Similarly, a person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is not liable unless he removes an article of significant size from one side [of the square] and places it down on the other side [of the square].

הַזּוֹרֵק מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת אוֹ הַמּוֹשִׁיט הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מוֹצִיא וְחַיָּב. וְכֵן הַזּוֹרֵק אוֹ הַמּוֹשִׁיט בְּיָדוֹ מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מוֹצִיא וְחַיָּב. וְהַזּוֹרֵק כִּלְאַחַר יָד פָּטוּר:

A person who throws an article from one domain 8a) states that in the construction of the Sanctuary, the craftsmen would throw their needles to each other. to another or who hands defines passing over as dragging an article along the ground. The Merkevet HaMishneh and others interpret it as passing an article from hand to hand. It appears that the Maggid Mishneh does not accept that interpretation, because the opening passage of Shabbat describes the transfer of objects from hand to hand as transfer (הוצ אה) and not handing over (הושטה). (See also the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger to this halachah.) [an article from one domain to a person in another domain] 11:2). Tosafot, Shabbat 2a explain that, in contrast to the other categories of forbidden labor, the consequence of the fact that the status of transferring is "an inferior labor," is that if the derivatives had not been found in the construction of the Sanctuary, they would not had been forbidden. is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.Similarly a person who throws or passes an article by hand from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable for performing a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of transferring.A person who throws in an abnormal manner is not liable.

הַמּוֹצִיא מִקְצָת הַחֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת מִשְּׁתֵּי רְשׁוּיוֹת אֵלּוּ לִרְשׁוּת שְׁנִיָּה פָּטוּר. עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל הַחֵפֶץ כֻּלּוֹ מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ לִרְשׁוּת זוֹ. קֻפָּה שֶׁהִיא מְלֵאָה חֲפָצִים אֲפִלּוּ מְלֵאָה חַרְדָּל וְהוֹצִיא רֻבָּהּ מֵרְשׁוּת זוֹ לִרְשׁוּת זוֹ פָּטוּר עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא אֶת כָּל הַקֻּפָּה וְכֵן כָּל הַדּוֹמֶה לָזֶה שֶׁהַכְּלִי מֵשִׂים כָּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּחֵפֶץ אֶחָד:

A person who transfers part of an object from one of these two domains [a private domain or a public domain] to the other is not liable until he transfers the entire object from one domain into the other.[For example,] if a container is filled with articles, even if it is filled with mustard [seed], and a person transferred the majority of it from one domain to the other, the person is not liable unless he transfers the entire container. 91b, the Merkevet HaMishneh draws attention to an apparent contradiction between the Rambam's decision here and in Hilchot Geneivah 3:2. The same applies in other similar situations. [The rationale is that] the container causes all the articles within it to be considered a single entity., אגד כלי שמיה אגד. Rashi and Rabbenu Chanan'el interpret this phrase slightly differently.In this context, it is worthy to note Rabbi Akiva Eiger's reference to Tosafot, Pesachim 85b. There it is explained that this principle applies only to a container that has a receptacle. If, however, an entity is suspended from a stave, different rules apply.

הַמּוֹצִיא בֵּין בִּימִינוֹ בֵּין בִּשְׂמֹאלוֹ בֵּין בְּתוֹךְ חֵיקוֹ אוֹ שֶׁיָּצָא בְּמָעוֹת צְרוּרִין לוֹ בִּסְדִינוֹ חַיָּב מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוֹצִיא כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין. וְכֵן הַמּוֹצִיא עַל כְּתֵפוֹ חַיָּב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַמַּשּׂאוֹי לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. שֶׁכֵּן הָיָה מַשָּׂא בְּנֵי קְהָת בַּמִּשְׁכָּן לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ז ט) "בַּכָּתֵף יִשָּׂאוּ". וְכָל הַמְּלָאכוֹת מִמִּשְׁכָּן לוֹמְדִין אוֹתָן:

A person who transfers an article in the ordinary fashion in which the article is transferred is liable, whether he transferred it [by carrying it] in his right hand, in his left hand, or in his bosom, or whether he transfers money bound up in a cloth. 301:39 interprets this as referring to a cloth that one is wearing. Even though the person is not holding the money in his hand, he is liable for transferring it. From this ruling, it is clear that a person who transfers objects in his pockets is liable just as if he transferred them by hand.Similarly, one is liable if one transferred the articles on one's shoulder. [This applies] although the article is [being carried] more than ten handbreadths high in the public domain,, a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying an object on his shoulders, for surely it would be held above that height. for this was the manner in which the sons of Kehat would carry [the sacred articles] of the Sanctuary above ten handbreadths high as [Numbers 7:9] states, "They shall carry them on their shoulders." As mentioned, all [the obligations for Sabbath] labors are derived from the Sanctuary.

אֲבָל הַמּוֹצִיא לְאַחַר יָדוֹ בְּרַגְלוֹ בְּפִיו וּבְמַרְפֵּקוֹ בְּאָזְנוֹ וּבִשְׂעָרוֹ וּבְכִיס שֶׁתָּפוּר בְּבִגְדוֹ וּפִי הַכִּיס לְמַטָּה בֵּין בֶּגֶד לְבֶגֶד, בְּפִי בִּגְדוֹ בְּמִנְעָלוֹ וּבְסַנְדָּלוֹ פָּטוּר שֶׁלֹּא הוֹצִיא כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין:

In contrast, a person is not liable for transferring an article on the back of his hand, 10:3). Others render this term as "in an abnormal manner." with his foot, in his mouth, explains that this does not refer to food. If a person walks from one domain to another while eating, he is liable for carrying the food he is holding in his mouth. (See also Chapter 13, Halachah 3.) in the crook of his arm,). in his ear, in a pocket sewn into his garment when the opening of the garment is facing downward,, according to his Commentary on the Mishnah. Others render this term as "money belt." between one garment and another, in the hem of one's garment,). in his shoe, and in his sandal. [The rationale is that] he did not transfer the articles as people usually do.

הַמּוֹצִיא מַשּׂאוֹי עַל רֹאשׁוֹ. אִם הָיָה מַשּׂאוֹי כָּבֵד כְּגוֹן שַׂק מָלֵא אוֹ תֵּבָה וּמִגְדָּל וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן שֶׁהוּא מֵשִׂים עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וְתוֹפֵשׂ בְּיָדוֹ חַיָּב. שֶׁכֵּן דֶּרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין וְנִמְצָא כְּמוֹצִיא עַל כְּתֵפוֹ אוֹ בְּיָדוֹ. אֲבָל אִם לָקַח חֵפֶץ קַל כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִנִּיחַ בֶּגֶד אוֹ סֵפֶר אוֹ סַכִּין עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוֹ וְהוּא אֵינוֹ אוֹחֵז בְּיָדוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר שֶׁלֹּא הוֹצִיא כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמּוֹצִיאִין. שֶׁאֵין דֶּרֶךְ רֹב הָעוֹלָם לְהוֹצִיא הַחֲפָצִין מֻנָּחִין עַל רָאשֵׁיהֶם. הַמַּעֲבִיר חֵפֶץ מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶעֱבִירוֹ לְמַעְלָה מֵרֹאשׁוֹ חַיָּב:

[The following rules apply when] a person transfers a burden, carrying it on his head: If the burden was heavy 105b relates that it was customary to carry a burden weighing four kabbim or more on one's head. In contemporary measure, this figure is approximately five and a half kilograms or twelve pounds. - e.g., a full sack, a chest, a cabinet, or the like - and the person places it on his head and holds it with his hands, states that a person who does not hold the article with his hand is not liable. Balancing a heavy article on one's head is a skilled task that only few individuals are capable of performing. Hence, it is not considered an ordinary manner of transferring an article. he is liable. This is the normal manner in which these articles are transferred, and this is thus equivalent to a person carrying an article on his shoulder or in his hand.If, however, the person placed a light article - e.g., a garment, a book, or a knife - on his head and transferred them without holding them in his hand, states that in this instance, even if one holds the article in one's hands, one is not liable, since this is not the ordinary way in which an article is transferred. he is not liable. He did not transfer them in the ordinary manner, for most people do not transfer articles by placing them on their heads. 92a regarding the practice of the inhabitants of Hotzel, a city in Babylon (Maggid Mishneh).A person who carries an article from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square] in the public domain is liable, even when he lifts it above his head., a place where one is not liable for carrying. Hence, one might think that a person is not liable for carrying if he lifts an object above that height while transferring it in the public domain. Nevertheless, since the article does not come to rest in the makom patur, one is held liable (Shabbat 8b,9a).The Ra'avad questions the Rambam's interpretation of that Talmudic passage and offers an alternative, which is accepted by the Rashba and Tosafot. The Rambam's interpretation is also offered by Rashi. (Alternatively, it is possible to explain that the Rambam's intent is that this is an ordinary, and not an abnormal, manner of carrying.

מֻתָּר לְאָדָם לְטַלְטֵל בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בְּתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁהוּא עוֹמֵד בְּצִדָּן. וְיֵשׁ לוֹ לְטַלְטֵל בְּכָל הַמְרֻבָּע הַזֶּה. וּבְאַמָּה שֶׁלּוֹ מוֹדְדִין. וְאִם הָיָה נַנָּס בְּאֵיבָרָיו נוֹתְנִין לוֹ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת כְּבֵינוֹנִיּוֹת שֶׁל כָּל אָדָם. וּמִפִּי הַקַּבָּלָה אָמְרוּ שֶׁזֶּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בַּתּוֹרָה (שמות טז כט) "שְׁבוּ אִישׁ תַּחְתָּיו" שֶׁלֹּא יְטַלְטֵל חוּץ לִמְרֻבָּע זֶה אֶלָּא בִּמְרֻבָּע זֶה שֶׁהוּא כְּמִדַּת אֹרֶךְ אָדָם כְּשֶׁיִּפְשֹׁט יָדָיו וְרַגְלָיו בּוֹ בִּלְבַד יֵשׁ לְטַלְטֵל:

It is permissible for a person to move objects in the public within a square four cubits by four cubits adjacent to the place where he is standing. He is allowed to move articles [freely] throughout this square. (Orach Chayim 349:1) accepts the Rambam's ruling.These cubits are measured according to the size of the person's arm. 48a). This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.). If, however, his arms are dwarf-sized, 48a, Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:1). he is granted four cubits according to the size of an average person's arms., a cubit is 48 centimeters; according to Chazon Ish, it is 57.7 centimetersAccording to the oral tradition, 48a, Mechilta, Beshalach 5, and other sources. this is the interpretation of the Torah's statement [Exodus 16:29]: "Every person should remain in his place," that every person should not move an article outside this square, only within it. [This square] represents the length of a human body when one extends one's hands and feet; only within it is one allowed to move objects. draws attention to a difference of opinion among the Sages, Eruvin 48a, regarding the extent to which one is allowed to carry in the public domain. Although the prevailing view is that one is allowed to carry in a square four cubits long, there are interpretations that state that one may carry four cubits in any direction. This means that although one may not carry an object eight cubits, one may carry an object four cubits on one side and four cubits on the other side.The view that the Rambam appears to accept, however, maintains that one may carry only in a single square four cubits long. (See also Chapter 27, Halachah 11.)

הָיוּ שְׁנַיִם מִקְצָת אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל זֶה לְתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל זֶה מְבִיאִין וְאוֹכְלִין בָּאֶמְצַע. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא זֶה מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלּוֹ לְתוֹךְ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ. וְאִם הָיוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה וְהָאֶמְצָעִי מֻבְלָע בֵּינְתַיִם. הוּא מֻתָּר עִמָּהֶן וְהֵן מֻתָּרִין עִמּוֹ וּשְׁנַיִם הַחִיצוֹנִים אֲסוּרִים זֶה עִם זֶה:

When two people [are standing near each other] and a portion of the four cubits [in which one may carry] extends into the four cubits [in which the other may carry], they may both bring [food] and eat in the center, provided one does not take something from [the area which is solely] his and bring it into [the area which is solely] his colleague's.If three people [are standing near each other] and the middle individual's [space] is enclosed within their space, he is permitted [to share] with them and they are permitted [to share] with him. The two individuals on the extremes, however, are forbidden [to share] with each other.

לְפִיכָךְ מֻתָּר לְאָדָם לַעֲקֹר חֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְלִתְּנוֹ לַחֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁעִמּוֹ בְּתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. וְכֵן חֲבֵרוֹ לַחֲבֵרוֹ הָאַחֵר שֶׁבְּצִדּוֹ אֲפִלּוּ הֵן מֵאָה. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַחֵפֶץ הוֹלֵךְ כַּמָּה מִילִין בְּשַׁבָּת מֻתָּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכָּל אֶחָד מֵהֶן לֹא טִלְטֵל אֶלָּא בְּתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ:

Based on the above, it is permitted for a person to lift up an article from the public domain and give it to a colleague who is near him, within his four cubits. The colleague may give it to another colleague standing at his side [who may pass it further]. Even if the article changes hands hundreds of times or is transferred several millim is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure. on the Sabbath, this is permissible, 95b only with regard to an extreme situation - i.e., an instance where tefillin or other sacred articles might be desecrated. He contends that it should not be extended beyond that context.Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:3) quotes the Rambam's ruling, some of the later authorities (see Turei Zahav 349:1) raise questions about this leniency. because each individual moved it only within the four cubits [granted] him.

הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ לוֹ לְאָדָם לְטַלְטֵל בְּכָל הַמְרֻבָּע שֶׁהוּא אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת נִמְצָא מְטַלְטֵל בְּאֹרֶךְ אֲלַכְסוֹנוֹ שֶׁל מְרֻבָּע זֶה חָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין הַמַּעֲבִיר אוֹ הַזּוֹרֵק בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲבִיר חוּץ לְחָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה. וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַרְנוּ מִתְּחִלַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע אוֹ הַמַּעֲבִיר אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת חַיָּב הוּא מִתְּחִלַּת הָאֲלַכְסוֹן שֶׁל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַד סוֹפוֹ וְאִם הֶעֱבִיר פָּחוֹת מִזֶּה פָּטוּר:

Since each person is allowed to carry within a square four cubits by four cubits, he is permitted to carry along the diagonal of this square which is five and three-fifths cubits long. Accordingly, a person who carries or throws an article in the public domain is not liable unless he moves it beyond five and three-fifths cubits [from its original place]. mentions that there were earlier authorities who maintain that one is liable for moving an article a measure of four cubits. Nevertheless, all the later authorities accept the law stated by the Rambam.Whenever we have mentioned [the phrases], "from the beginning [of a square] four cubits long to the end [of that square]" or "one who carries an object four cubits is liable," the intent was [the distance] from the beginning of the diagonal of a four cubit [square] until its end. If a person carries an object for a shorter distance, he is not liable.

נִמְצָא כָּאן שָׁלֹשׁ מִדּוֹת. כֵּיצַד. הָעוֹקֵר חֵפֶץ מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים מִמָּקוֹם זֶה וְהִנִּיחוֹ בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים אִם הָיָה בֵּין שְׁנֵי הַמְּקוֹמוֹת עַד אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. הָיָה בֵּינֵיהֶן יֶתֶר מֵאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת וַעֲדַיִן הֵן בְּתוֹךְ חָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה פָּטוּר. הָיָה בֵּינֵיהֶן חָמֵשׁ אַמּוֹת וּשְׁלֹשָׁה חֻמְשֵׁי אַמָּה בְּשָׁוֶה הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב שֶׁהֲרֵי הֶעֱבִיר הַחֵפֶץ חוּץ לַאֲלַכְסוֹנוֹ שֶׁל מְרֻבָּע:

Thus, there are three [levels of responsibility that apply when] a person lifts up an object from one place in the public domain and places it down in another place in the public domain: If there are less than four cubits between these two places, the act is permitted.If there are more than four cubits but less than five and three-fifths cubits between the two places, [the act is forbidden, but the person] is not liable. 98b, Rashi, Tosafot, and Rabbenu Asher (see also the gloss of the Ra'avad) do not accept the Rambam's ruling and place no restrictions on carrying within five and three-fifths cubits. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 349:2) mentions the Rambam's view, it accepts the decision of the other authorities. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 349:2, however, states that at the outset, the Rambam's view should be followed. If there are more than five and three-fifths cubits, the person is liable, because he moved an article beyond the diagonal of a square [four cubits long].